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Chris Carter was one of the most successful writers and creators of television in 
the 1990s.1  His works include “Millennium” and, most prominently, “The X-
Files.”2  Mr. Carter created “The X-Files” and was the program’s ‘showrunner,’ 
meaning he either made or approved every creative decision associated with each 
episode—including the writing, the direction, the set design, the costuming and the 
editing.3  As is common in the world of audiovisual entertainment, Mr. Carter did 
not own the copyright to “The X-Files.”4  This created a problem for Mr. Carter, 
since the commercial success of “The X-Files” made it a prime candidate for 
syndication.  Syndication, also known as second run programming, is the most 
lucrative aspect of television production.5  The owner of “The X-Files,” Twentieth 
Century Fox Television, sold the program’s syndication rights to a separate Fox 
subsidiary, the FX Network.6  This original sale led to allegations of self-dealing.  
Fox subsequently resyndicated the program with a competitor, NBC Universal’s 
USA Network.7  When Fox resyndicated, however, the studio claimed that the 
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 1. See Gina McIntyre, Chris Carter Gets All Foxy About ‘X-Files’, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at 
E1 (discussing “groundbreaking” nature of the “X-Files”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See DAVID WILD, THE SHOWRUNNERS:  A SEASON INSIDE THE BILLION-DOLLAR, DEATH-
DEFYING, MADCAP WORLD OF TELEVISION’S REAL STARS 3 (1999) (discussing showrunner’s creative 
control over all aspects of production). 
 4. Symposium, Restoring the Balance:  Panel on Contracting and Bargaining, 28 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 419, 429 (2005) (“[F]ilm is still a work-for-hire medium.  Most agreements have work-for-hire 
broad language which gives the studio worldwide perpetual rights . . . .”). 
 5. See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS:  A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL 
ANALYSIS 197 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing that “the real payoff” in television production is only achieved 
upon syndication).  As an example, it is estimated that a single episode of “The Simpsons” generates 
four million dollars in syndication fees.  See JOSEPH STRAUBHAAR, ROBERT LAROSE & LUCINDA 
DAVENPORT, MEDIA NOW:  UNDERSTANDING MEDIA, CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY 227 (7th ed. 2011). 
 6. See Second Amended Complaint, Duchovny v. Fox Entm’t Grp., No. SC058329, 2000 WL 
35449092, at *9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2000) (detailing license to FX). 
 7. See id. (alleging self-dealing by Fox); Maria Aspan, ‘X-Files’ are Closed; a Lawsuit Opens, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at C6.  The resyndication may have been prompted by David Duchovny’s 
original lawsuit prompting self-dealing.  See generally Second Amended Complaint, Duchovny v. Fox 
Entm’t Grp., No. SC058329, 2000 WL 35449092 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2000) (detailing license to 
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agreement with USA was not a new syndication agreement, but, rather, an 
assignment of the original agreement with FX.8  This distinction was particularly 
important for Mr. Carter because his employment agreement guaranteed him a 
percentage of each syndication agreement entered into by Fox.9  If the deal with 
USA was simply an assignment, Mr. Carter was due no portion of a lucrative 
contract.  Mr. Carter promptly filed suit to enforce what he believed were his 
syndication rights.10 
Although lawsuits over syndication fees are unusual, Mr. Carter’s situation was 
not uncommon.  The modern screenwriter, whether creating works for film or 
television, does not own her work and is dependent on her employer for 
remuneration, no matter how commercially successful her creation is or how much 
creative control she exerted over the work in question.11  As the ownership of 
audiovisual works has become increasingly consolidated, issues of self-dealing and 
other actions harmful to screenwriters have been exacerbated.12  These issues are 
not limited to financial concerns:  media consolidation has other deleterious effects, 
including a narrower variety of artistic voices being given the opportunity to tell 
their stories.13  While numerous forces contribute to creating this difficult business 
and creative environment for the screenwriter, one significant factor is the work for 
hire doctrine. 
The work for hire doctrine is a legal mechanism by which the creator of an 
artistic work’s employer is deemed the author of that work.14  While, historically, 
such employer ownership schemes were not recognized by courts, today the work 
for hire doctrine is a firmly embedded part of American copyright law.15  In 
particular, work for hire has developed into an essential tool of the audiovisual 
entertainment industry.16  As discussed in Part I.B, infra, there are a number of 
reasons that work for hire is a particularly useful ownership allocation scheme for 
audiovisual works. 
Modern technological developments are, however, rapidly altering the nature 
and form of the entertainment industry.  Changes in both costs of and accessibility 
to production and distribution tools present greater opportunity for audiovisual 
 
FX).  At the time of that lawsuit, a former USA Network executive claimed USA would have outbid FX 
but was “shut out of the bidding.”  See Joe Flint, It’s Fox vs. Fox, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, Sept. 3, 
1999, at 15-16. 
 8. Aspan, supra note 7. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing Hollywood’s accounting and fee 
sharing practices). 
 12. See STRAUBHAAR, supra note 5, at 227 (“Many independent producers have been forced out 
of business or have been gobbled up by the Big Five [studios].”).  See also infra Part I.B (discussing 
media consolidation). 
 13. See infra notes 61–66.  Similarly, the reduction of potential outlets for audiovisual works has 
decreased audiovisual artists’ already modest bargaining power.  Id. 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer . . . is considered 
the author.”).  See also id. § 101 (delineating requirements of works made for hire). 
 15. See infra Part I.A (sketching the historical development of the work for hire doctrine). 
 16. See infra Part I.B (discussing work for hire in the modern entertainment industry). 
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artists to create and display their work.17  Theoretically, this increased access could 
lead to greater creative freedom for audiovisual artists who will no longer be bound 
by the studio-dominated production and distribution system.  This freedom, in turn, 
could produce public benefits, including exposure to a wider array of artists and to 
the stories of individuals with diverse backgrounds currently underrepresented in 
the audiovisual arts.18  Despite these potential benefits, a number of structural and 
economic factors make the dissolution of the current studio-based system of 
audiovisual production highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.19 
This Note will explore the possibility that altering or replacing the work for hire 
doctrine could significantly improve the ability of audiovisual artists to take 
advantage of technological developments in production and distribution.  Part I will 
discuss the history of work for hire, the doctrine’s role in allocating ownership of 
audiovisual works, and the present audiovisual entertainment landscape that has 
resulted, in part, from application of the doctrine.  Part II will first examine 
technological advances in audiovisual entertainment and how those advances might 
benefit individual artists, and then point to specific issues particular to live-action 
audiovisual entertainment that could prevent artists from taking full advantage of 
these technological opportunities.  Part III will suggest modifications to the work 
for hire doctrine that would allow audiovisual artists to more fully exploit new 
technologies while still working within the studio system. 
I.  WORK FOR HIRE AND THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 
Today, works for hire are pervasive in American copyright industries and are 
particularly dominant in audiovisual entertainment.  But the work for hire doctrine 
has not always been a part of the American conception of intellectual property 
ownership.  Before 1909, there was no explicit work for hire doctrine in American 
copyright law.20  Early cases held that an artist retained the rights in her work, even 
if that work had been expressly commissioned.21  Beginning in the mid-1800s, 
 
 17. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX 34 (2008) [hereinafter LESSIG, REMIX] (arguing that the 
“future could see the emergence of a form of economic enterprise . . . that promises extraordinary 
economic opportunity”); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 177 (2006) (“The networked 
public sphere . . . seems to invert the mass-media model in that it is driven heavily by what dense 
clusters of users find intensely interesting . . . .”). 
 18. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of increased artistic 
freedom in the digital age). 
 19. See infra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties beyond basic production and distribution costs 
that weigh heavily in favor of the studio model). 
 20. For a thorough discussion of the development of the work for hire doctrine before the 
Copyright Act of 1909, see generally CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE:  EMPLOYEE 
INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800–1930 (2009).  See also 
Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work:  The Origins of the Work for Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J. L. & 
HUMAN. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Fisk, Origins]. 
 21. See, e.g., Atwill v. Ferret, 2 F. Cas. 195, 197 (C.C. N.Y. 1846) (holding employer only has 
copyright interest insofar as he has made an intellectual contribution to the work); Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 
F. Cas. 652, 659 (C.C. Mass. 1846) (denying employer’s right to claim extension on copyright which he 
had been assigned). 
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courts began to recognize that employers could hold rights in the creations of their 
employees.22  Early employer rights were often framed as a matter of equity.23  By 
the turn of the century, the concept that employers could hold ownership rights in 
the works of employees had become entrenched.  This became clear in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., when the Court 
acknowledged that the advertisements in question “belonged to the plaintiffs, they 
having been produced by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in their 
establishment to make those very things.”24 
The idea of granting an employer rights in the creation of an employee’s work 
was codified in the Copyright Act of 1909.  In drafting the Act, Congress went 
beyond simply assigning copyright to an employer; it turned the employer into the 
author of the work.25  There were a number of reasons for the decision, but the 
most significant was that employers wanted the right of renewal that came with 
authorship.26 
Even during the drafting of the 1909 Act, there was concern about the 
constitutionality of bestowing authorship on entities other than the actual creator of 
a work.27  This concern was exacerbated by the expansion of work for hire in the 
Copyright Act of 1976.28  Courts have not been presented with the question of 
 
 22. See, e.g., Root v. Borst, 36 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1894) (stating employee retained copyright 
because work in question was created outside the scope of his employment); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. 
Cas. 26, 34 (C.C. Mass. 1869) (differentiating Atwill and Fowle in holding that a written assignment was 
not necessary for ownership to vest in an employer). 
 23. See, e.g., Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 185 (C.C. Pa. 1861) (recognizing a theater 
owner’s rights in his employee’s production based on equitable theory). 
 24. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903). 
 25. Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. 
(2010)) (“[T]he word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”). 
 26. See Fisk, Origins, supra note 20, at 6.  Congress ensured that the desired outcome was 
achieved.  See id. at 62 (arguing there were three primary considerations:  (1) ease of drafting, (2) 
avoiding constitutional conflict regarding the term authors and (3) availability of copyright renewal).  It 
is not at all clear that the drafters really considered the full implications of turning the employer into the 
‘author’ of an employee’s work.  If such a debate occurred, it was not recorded in the legislative history.  
See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe 
Goldman eds., 1976).  See also Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1080 (“[I]n the case of . . . any work 
copyrighted by a corporate body or by an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor 
of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension.”). 
 27. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited:  Authors, Markets, and Liberal 
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L. J. 186, 263 (2008) (discussing “expressed 
concern[s]” of legislators about constitutionality of “employers as original owners, rather than 
assignees”). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining works made for hire as either works created by traditional 
employees or as specially commissioned works in limited categories).  The constitutionality of the work 
for hire doctrine and its subsequent expansion has been questioned by scholars examining its application 
in a number of situations.  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act 
of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 600 (1987) (suggesting that, in the context of academic works, the 
doctrine may violate both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment); Jane C. Ginsburg, The 
Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1090 (2003) 
(“Whatever the practical merits of the work for hire doctrine, the constitutional text supplies no 
grounding for it.”); Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again—Determining Authorship in a 
Sound Recording, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 188 (2006) (arguing that applying work for hire 
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whether the work for hire doctrine might violate the Constitutional mandate.29  
Some commentary has suggested that the doctrine is not unconstitutional because it 
is not mandatory—creators and employers may contract around it.30 
The converse of this argument is also valid:  without the work for hire doctrine, 
employees could still contract away their full bundle of rights to an employer.31  
Since the bargaining position of the creative employee in the audiovisual 
entertainment industry is generally weak, it might be assumed that contractual 
arrangements of this kind would proliferate.  On the other hand, there is reason to 
believe that technological developments could markedly increase the creative 
artist’s ability to secure more favorable working terms.32  It is not so easy, 
however, to conceive of film and television production without work for hire:  the 
doctrine is both well suited for and deeply ingrained in the entertainment industry. 
A.  THE INTERTWINING OF WORK FOR HIRE AND AUDIOVISUAL 
ENTERTAINMENT 
While work for hire is a significant part of many American intellectual property 
industries, the doctrine was particularly well suited for adaptation by the 
audiovisual entertainment industry.  Three factors, discussed below, were 
particularly significant:  (1) work for hire ‘solved’ the difficult issues of copyright 
ownership in a work with numerous creative contributors; (2) it maintained the 
historical role of audiovisual artists as mere employees; and (3) it represented a 
rational economic response to an art form in which production and distribution 
 
to sound recordings would “fly in the face of the Constitution if it becomes the norm instead of the 
exception”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Authors in Disguise:  Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Got it 
Wrong, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 741, 748-49 (2007) (“[T]he work-for-hire doctrine as applied takes away 
with one stroke of the pen the constitutional guarantee for the initial and true author.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); John P. Strohm, Writings in the Margin (of Error):  The Authorship Status of Sound 
Recordings Under United States Copyright Law, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 127, 133 (2004) (“[E]ven beyond 
the mythology of authorship, work for hire remains difficult to square with the apparent intentions of the 
Framers of the Constitution.”). 
 29. See Cmty for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (deciding breadth of work 
for hire doctrine without considering constitutionality).  But see Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 
(2d. Cir. 1991) (stating in dicta that “[i]t has not been supposed that the statutory grant of ‘authorship’ 
status to the employer of a work made for hire exceeds the Constitution, though the employer has shown 
skill only in selecting employees, not in creating protectable expression”).  For instances of courts 
applying the 1909 Act’s work for hire provision, see Brown v. Mollé Co., 20 F. Supp. 135, 136 
(S.D.N.Y. 1937); Yale Univ. Press v. Row, Peterson & Co., 40 F.2d 290, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Nat’l 
Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215, 217 (C.C. Pa. 1911). 
 30. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.06[C] (2011) 
(arguing work for hire doctrine is constitutional because 17 U.S.C. § 201 allows parties to “agree 
otherwise” and assign copyright to creator-employee); see also David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by 
the Marital Community:  Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L. REV. 383, 405-06 (1998). 
 31. See generally Judith Beth Prowda, Work for Hire, Freedom of Contract, and the “Creative 
Genius” After the Martha Graham Case, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 645, 672 (discussing “robustly 
contractarian” nature of American copyright law). 
 32. See infra Part II.A (discussing technological advances in audiovisual production and 
distribution); see also infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (detailing theoretical improvements in 
the bargaining power of audiovisual artists). 
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presented major logistical and financial challenges. 
1.  Issues in Ownership of Audiovisual Works 
The determination of copyright ownership in films is rife with complexity.  
Films are necessarily the product of a large number of creative contributions.  At a 
minimum, both directors and screenwriters can claim creative ownership of a 
film.33  Moreover, what could be characterized as creative contributions are made 
by a number of other individuals, including performers, cinematographers, set 
designers and editors.  The default rule, in the absence of the work for hire doctrine, 
would likely be that films are joint works.34  Supporters of work for hire argue that 
such an arrangement would be impractical at best.35  The argument is that when a 
piece of intellectual property requires numerous creative inputs, work for hire 
facilitates the economic exploitation of the work in question by “consolidat[ing] 
ownership in a single entity that will . . . pay for the privilege of being the owner of 
the work for hire, rewarding the creative authors accordingly, enabling consumers 
to receive entertainment and information goods at the lowest possible cost, and 
advancing the purpose of the copyright system overall.”36  It should be noted, 
however, that “artists’ rights” countries, such as France and Spain, have managed 
to allocate audiovisual ownership rights without implementing the work for hire 
doctrine.37 
2.  Historical Role of the Screenwriter 
The second reason work for hire meshed so readily with audiovisual 
entertainment is historical.  Early motion pictures had little resemblance to the 
films that have come to play a significant role in American popular culture.  These 
initial forays into motion picture entertainment were extremely brief and related 
 
 33. Film has historically been considered a director’s medium.  However, the auteur or “one man, 
one film” theory of filmmaking is more rightly considered an outgrowth of film criticism techniques and 
Hollywood marketing than an accurate representation of the director as the sole creative force in the 
creation of a story told on celluloid.  See, e.g., IAN SCOTT, IN CAPRA’S SHADOW:  THE LIFE & CAREER 
OF SCREENWRITER ROBERT RISKIN 6–7 (2006) (discussing Writers Guild of America President’s 
contention that a screenwriter’s contribution was “the centripetal force holding together Capra’s . . . 
movies”).  See generally JOSEPH MCBRIDE, FRANK CAPRA:  THE CATASTROPHE OF SUCCESS (1992) 
(arguing against director’s “one man, one film” assertion of complete creative control). 
 34. See F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures 
Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 228 (2001) (discussing potential problems with joint 
works analysis under existing copyright laws). 
 35. See United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. 137 (2000) (statement of Paul Goldstein, Lillick Professor of Law, Stanford Law School), 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65223.000/hju65223_0f.htm (arguing 
that obtaining licenses from joint authors throughout the lifetime of a copyright would present great 
difficulties). 
 36. Id.  Goldstein claims this is “the genius of the work for hire concept.” 
 37. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of ownership schemes in artists’ rights countries. 
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only the simplest of stories.38  Storytelling, acting and other hallmarks of modern 
cinema were considered unimportant:  the selling point was the novelty of the 
technology.39  Even at this early stage, there were ‘script writers,’ men who would 
write the interstitial cards that provided the dialogue for silent films.  These early 
writers were often newspapermen or other professionals moonlighting in search of 
additional wages.40  They were hired by producers on a project-by-project basis to 
flesh out the producers’ ideas.41  Thus, from the beginnings of filmmaking, the 
producer was pre-eminent; writers and other creative personnel were employees. 
While motion pictures evolved rapidly over the subsequent decades, the 
relationship between the employee-writer and the employer-producer has never 
been significantly altered.  The 1927 release of The Jazz Singer, the first feature 
length film with synchronized dialogue, marked the beginning of the modern 
audiovisual era.42  The addition of synchronized dialogue to motion pictures was a 
creative and technological leap forward.  More significantly, the high costs 
associated with the transition to sound pictures led to the consolidation that resulted 
in the studio system that dominated Hollywood from the 1930s through the early 
1960s.43  The studio system further entrenched the notion of creative personnel as 
mere employees:  writers, directors and actors were signed to long-term contracts, 
terminable only at the studios’ discretion.44 
Even after the dissolution of the studio system, the writer remained an 
employee.45  The end of the studio system signaled an end to the long-term contract 
for creative talent.  For the first time, writers and other creative entities were 
freelance workers who could theoretically create audiovisual works in which they 
 
 38. Examples include “a comic film . . . depict[ing] the experiences of Mr. Cityman . . . in the 
suburbs” and a “photographic reproduction of various places passed during a trip from Christiana to the 
North Cape.”  BENJAMIN B. HAMPTON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY FROM ITS 
BEGINNINGS TO 1931 38 (1970). 
 39. See id. at 47 (describing perception of motion picture business as “a cheap, flimsy upstart” 
that would “sweep[] the country off its feet and [die] just as quickly”).  Reinforcing the idea that motion 
pictures were a product and not art was the fact that distributors described films in terms of how many 
feet of film stock they used.  See id. at 38 (noting descriptions of films The Suburbanites and The Lost 
Child indicated their respective film stock lengths of 718 feet and 538 feet). 
 40. Id. at 48. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally SCOTT EYMAN, THE SPEED OF SOUND:  HOLLYWOOD AND THE TALKIE 
REVOLUTION, 1926–1930 (1997). 
 43. See MICHAEL J. HAUPERT, THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 106 (2006) (“Only the largest 
studios could afford the conversion to sound . . . .  As a result, mergers occurred or smaller distributors 
simply went out of business.”). 
 44. See HAMPTON, supra note 38, at 304–17 (discussing attempts to organize studios on factory 
lines); MCBRIDE, supra note 33, at 556 (discussing Frank Capra’s multi-year contract with Paramount 
Pictures). 
 45. In 1948, the Supreme Court found that the business model of the “Big Eight” studios violated 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143 (1948).  Up 
until that point, the studios had owned the large “first run” theater chains, completely controlling the 
market for film exhibition.  After Paramount Pictures, the studios were forced to divest themselves of 
the theater chains.  Increased opportunity for exhibition led to the creation of numerous independent 
competitors.  See HAUPERT, supra note 43, at 168. 
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retained the copyright.46  Almost as soon as this possibility arose, writers once 
again gave up the right to own their creative expression.  In 1954, screenwriters 
formed the Writers Guild of America (WGA).47  The WGA was, and is, a labor 
union whose primary function is to represent its membership in collective 
bargaining agreements with the major Hollywood studios.48  Of course, 
membership in a union comes with at least one very specific prerequisite:  you 
must be an employee.49  In joining a union, screenwriters expressly acknowledged 
that they were not independent creative entities:  they were studio employees 
whose terms of employment were subject to the collective bargaining agreement 
reached by their representatives.  Moreover, the Writers Guild’s original Minimum 
Basic Agreement (MBA) simply assumed that a film’s producer would own both 
the film and the underlying screenplay.50  This assumption remains a central part of 
the WGA’s MBA today.51 
It is important to recognize that a number of factors made the formation of the 
WGA and acceptance of employee status a positive development for writers.  For 
one, writers at the time were paid and treated extremely poorly.52  Further, they 
lacked basic medical and financial protections in the form of employer health and 
 
 46. The 1909 Copyright Act created work for hire for employees.  It did not extend to 
commissioned works in specific categories, as the 1976 Copyright Act did.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) 
(defining work made for hire as either the work of an employee or as a commissioned work in one of 
eight specific categories).  As discussed in Part II, infra, the “commissioned works” clause has been 
stretched by modern Hollywood studios to cover works created both within and without the studio 
structure. 
 47. The WGA was the first creative union that purported to represent all audiovisual writers.  
However, it was predated by a number of other, smaller labor unions that represented various types of 
screenwriters.  See generally History, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, http://www.wga.org/history/ 
timeline.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (providing timeline from earliest attempts at screenwriter 
unionization through the present day).  See also Catherine L. Fisk, Screen Credit and the Writers Guild 
of America, 1938–2000:  A Study in Labor Market and Idea Market Intermediation 7–12 (August 2010), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=catherine_fisk [hereinafter Fisk, 
Screen Credit] (discussing early attempts at unionization). 
 48. See Who We Are, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/ 
who_we_are/fyi09.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (outlining membership and functions of WGA). 
 49. See Matt Prager, Essay on WGA Strike (on file with author), LESSIG 2.0, available at 
http://lessig.org/blog/prager.pdf (decrying writers’ acceptance of employee status). 
 50. See Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 47, at 13 (noting that the first Minimum Basic Agreement 
focused on securing writers screen credit and a minimum wage). 
 51. See 2008 Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, 8 (Feb. 
13, 2008), available at http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/writers_resources/contracts/MBA08.pdf 
[hereinafter WGA 2008 MBA] (defining “writer” as an individual “employed by the Company to write 
literary material”).  The MBA also acknowledges that screenwriters are not “authors” for the purposes of 
copyright by refusing to include language about royalties, since that is a term associated with payments 
made to authors.  See id. at 197 (discussing residuals protection). 
 52. See NANCY LYNN SCHWARTZ, THE HOLLYWOOD WRITERS’ WARS 18 (1982) (describing the 
necessity of labor union protections for screenwriters).  A particular concern for writers was receiving 
proper credit for their work.  Id.  See also Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 47, at 10–13 (discussing the 
importance of screen credit in the formation of the Writers Guild).  Interestingly, however, today the 
WGA itself limits the number of writers who may receive onscreen credit for a particular project.  See 
id. at 33–34. 
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pension plans.53  But perhaps the most important reason that writers were willing to 
forgo any copyright claim in their works was a basic economic concern:  the 
prohibitive cost of production and distribution meant that individual writers lacked 
the means to exploit their copyrights, even if they retained full ownership.  The 
economic barrier to both production and distribution of audiovisual works is the 
third reason that the work for hire doctrine proved a natural fit for the audiovisual 
entertainment industry. 
3.  Overcoming Logistical and Financial Challenges 
The strongest argument for the work for hire doctrine in the audiovisual 
entertainment industry is that, without it, the studios would not be properly 
compensated for their massive investment in production and distribution costs.  The 
costs involved in both production and distribution of feature films have 
traditionally been beyond the resources of individual creative artists.54  Even when 
the costs are borne by the studios, there is significant risk that the conglomerate 
will not recoup its investment.55  Since the majority of audiovisual works will fail 
to recover the costs associated with developing, producing and distributing them, 
the entertainment industry relies on the overwhelming profitability of a small 
number of successes.56  As film and television budgets have risen, it has become 
increasingly difficult to sustain this business model.  Modern studios therefore seek 
to fully exploit their copyrighted works through licensing, exploitation of alternate 
entertainment mediums such as the DVD, merchandising and the creation of film 
sequels or television spinoffs.57  The necessity, at least from the studio’s point of 
view, of full commercial exploitation of the copyrighted work has resulted in a 
modern entertainment landscape in which virtually no creative artists are allowed to 
maintain ownership in their creations. 
B.  MODERN OWNERSHIP OF AUDIOVISUAL WORKS 
The present structure of the audiovisual entertainment industry bears a striking 
 
 53. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, at 18–20. 
 54. See SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ:  THE BASIC BUSINESS, LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS 
OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 12 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that “few companies have the financial stamina” to put 
up the large amount of capital demanded by film production).  Moreover, beyond even the economic 
realities, distribution by an individual artist has long been impossible:  studios controlled the major 
television networks and had long-standing relationships with the theater chains they once owned.  This 
all but precluded an individualized distribution. 
 55. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH:  THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 219–27 
(2011) [hereinafter WU, MASTER SWITCH] (discussing the difficulty of predicting commercial success of 
audiovisual products). 
 56. See MOORE, supra note 54, at 12 (arguing “[t]he film industry is a form of gambling, similar 
to wildcat oil drilling”). 
 57. See WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 55, at 228 (“The returns on the film are thereby 
understood to include not simply the box office receipts, but also both the appreciation in the property 
value, and its associated licensing revenue—merchandise, from toys to movie tie-in editions and other 
derivative works.”). 
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similarity to the studio system of the 1930s through the 1960s.  Five corporate 
entities produce, distribute and control the copyright of the vast majority of 
commercial audiovisual works created in the United States.58  In part, the 
emergence of these mega-companies can be linked to the same factors that gave 
rise to the original studio system:  the high costs and subsequent risks of producing 
and distributing audiovisual entertainment.59  However, another significant factor 
was that the ownership rules in television had changed.  The repeal of the Financial 
Interest / Syndication Act in 1992 marked the first time that entities who owned 
television networks—and thus controlled product distribution—could also own that 
product.60  The network owners moved quickly to take advantage of the new 
opportunity.  In 1992, the networks were responsible for roughly thirty percent of 
programming; by 2007, they owned nearly three-quarters of all television 
programming and almost every piece of scripted programming airing on American 
television.61  The networks achieved consolidation primarily through two avenues: 
favoring work produced and owned by the networks themselves, and acquiring 
independent production companies unable to compete against that preference.62 
For screenwriters and other audiovisual artists, the reemergence of a 
consolidated studio structure has meant even greater obstacles to ownership of their 
creative works.63  First, the decrease in the number of potential distribution outlets 
for their work has negatively impacted their potential bargaining power—with 
fewer options, artists’ ability to ‘shop’ their projects for the best possible deal is 
significantly decreased.  Second, the owners of the distribution networks are now 
actively incentivized to refuse distribution of independent works since any 
independent work that a conglomerate chose to distribute would likely take the 
place of the conglomerate’s own intellectual property. 
Thus, the ownership environment faced by the modern screenwriter is one in 
which she is denied ownership by statute, by the economic necessities of 
production and distribution and by the simple force of tradition.64  However, 
 
 58. See Mark Cooper, Study 23:  The Impact of the Vertically Integrated Television-Movie Studio 
Oligopoly on Source Diversity and Independent Production, in THE CASE AGAINST MEDIA 
CONSOLIDATION:  EVIDENCE ON CONCENTRATION, LOCALISM AND DIVERSITY (Mark N. Cooper ed., 
2007) [hereinafter Cooper, Study 23].  As of this writing, those five corporations are News Corp., 
Disney, CBS-Viacom, Time Warner and Comcast.  Comcast recently acquired NBC Universal 
Entertainment from General Electric.  See Tim Arango, G.E. Makes It Official:  NBC Will Go to 
Comcast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at B3 (describing basic agreement for Comcast’s acquisition). 
 59. See WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 55, at 228 (arguing that the primary goal of 
entertainment conglomerates is to hedge the risk of motion picture production with other businesses that 
historically show a more consistent return on investment). 
 60. Christine Becker, Fin-syn Begin Again? The Rhetoric of Deregulation, UNIVERSITY OF 
NOTRE DAME, http://www2.dse.unibo.it/picci//becker_fin_syn.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) 
(discussing the effects of Fin-Syn repeal in light of 2003 relaxation of newspaper ownership 
regulations). 
 61. Cooper, Study 23, supra note 58, at 339–40. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
 64. The very idea of a screenwriter retaining ownership of her work is considered anathema in 
modern Hollywood.  See, e.g., STEPHEN F. BREIMER, CLAUSE BY CLAUSE:  THE SCREENWRITER’S 
LEGAL GUIDE 7 (1998) (warning aspiring screenwriters to accept the surrender of their intellectual 
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technological advances, particularly the development of digital video cameras and 
Internet-embedded video players, raise the possibility that screenwriters can 
produce and distribute their work outside of the strictures of the modern studio 
system and, thus, avoid the application of the work for hire doctrine.65  At the same 
time, as discussed in Part II.C, infra, a number of quasi-legal and economic factors 
may still force screenwriters to accept studio employment—and submit to the work 
for hire doctrine—in order to see their visions realized.  Therefore, as discussed in 
Part III, infra, if screenwriters are to be afforded the full opportunity to take 
advantage of technological advances and regain some level of control over their 
creative works, it may be necessary to replace the work for hire doctrine, or at least 
revisit the manner in which it is applied. 
II.  DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY:  OPPORTUNITIES & BARRIERS 
The advancement of various digital technologies has the potential to radically 
alter numerous creative endeavors.  In particular, the Internet can potentially act as 
an efficient, affordable distribution conduit that directly connects the artist to the 
audience.  Some scholars have suggested that the effect of the Internet on creative 
works will be even more far-reaching—that the future of artistic creation is more 
likely to be found in the crowd sourcing of thousands than in the industrially 
financed vision of the individual.66  In such discussions, American copyright law is 
often seen as a tool wielded by the entrenched entertainment conglomerates to stave 
off an Internet-fueled dissolution of their long-standing economic model.67  A 
number of alternatives to traditional copyright law, most prominently Creative 
Commons, have been suggested as a means of allowing Internet-buttressed, crowd 
sourced creativity to flourish.68  In some ways, these alternative licensing schemes 
would benefit the audiovisual artist attempting to work outside the studio system.  
However, there are a number of issues particular to live-action audiovisual 
production that make traditional copyright protection the optimal legal structure to 
fully incentivize the creation of television and film. 
Section A of Part II will discuss the particular ways in which digital 
 
property rights lest they be labeled “a whiner” and stating:  “[T]he system is the system.  It is unlikely to 
change.”). 
 65. See Sections II.A and II.B for a discussion of lowered barriers to production and distribution 
and possible effects of this new level of access for creators. 
 66. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 17, at 3 (discussing the emergence of a “networked 
information economy” typified by “new and important cooperative and coordinate action carried out 
through radically distributed, nonmarket mechanisms that do not depend on proprietary strategies”). 
 67. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 109 
(2008) (“[I]n a classic case of the tail wagging the dog, the copyright industry manages to threaten our 
freedom and our culture.”); see also, BENKLER, supra note 17, at 37 (arguing that the Internet will allow  
“some businesses [to] capture the economic value of their information production by means other than 
exclusive control over their products” and that, therefore, “the justification for regulating access by 
granting copyrights or patents is weakened.”). 
 68. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 44–46 (examining wide range of intellectual property rights 
allocation schemes); cf. LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 17, at 254–72 (proposing alterations to copyright 
law to account for technological advancements in digital creation and distribution). 
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technologies are changing the nature of audiovisual production and distribution, 
and briefly examine early forays into nonstudio, professional production created 
specifically for the Internet.  Section B will then examine how alternate intellectual 
property protection schemes, such as Creative Commons, might benefit the 
audiovisual artist trying to create works outside the studio system.  Section C will 
explore the issues that audiovisual artists would encounter in trying to produce 
nonstudio works, with a particular focus on the costs associated with the numerous 
intertwining labor agreements of entertainment industry labor unions. 
A.  DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, THE INTERNET AND CREATIVE OPPORTUNITY 
Digital technology has enhanced the ability of audiovisual artists to create works 
outside of the studio system by lowering the economic barriers to both distribution 
and production.  Currently, nonstudio supported audiovisual works primarily take 
the form of Web 2.0 content—‘amateur’ video with comparatively low production 
values.  However, an increasing number of artists are producing high-quality 
professional works and distributing them directly on the Internet.69  While a few of 
these productions have been critical or financial successes, it remains to be seen 
whether such independent creations can form the basis for an ongoing 
developmental platform for audiovisual works.
 70 
Basic Internet distribution is, by now, commonplace in modern society.  The 
clearest example is, of course, Google’s YouTube, where anyone—amateur or 
professional—can upload any sort of video he or she wishes.71  Some individuals 
have turned this free distribution of their product into financial success.72  
Generally, however, Web 2.0 stars have been the creators of amateur video that 
cannot be, and was not intended to be, confused with mainstream professional 
audiovisual productions.  An example of this type of creation is the popular 
YouTube character “Fred,” portrayed by sixteen-year-old Lucas Cruikshank.  The 
“Fred” pieces, short videos shot by Cruikshank and uploaded to the Internet, 
garnered more than seventy million views on YouTube between 2005 and 2009.73  
But the videos were unquestionably amateur in their production values, and when it 
came time to create a feature film based on the Fred character, Mr. Cruikshank 
turned to Hollywood professionals to create the product.74 
 
 69. See infra notes 82–99 and accompanying text (discussing successes and failures of high-
quality professional productions distributed via the Internet). 
 70. See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (detailing success of Internet series “Dr. 
Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog”). 
 71. There are, in fact, a few restrictions on the sort of content YouTube allows.  See YouTube 
Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines (last visited Sept. 
22, 2011) (describing content YouTube refuses to host, including adult content, graphic or gratuitous 
violence and drug use). 
 72. See William Wei, Meet the YouTube Stars Making $100,000 Plus Per Year, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/meet-the-richest-independent-youtube-stars-
2010-8 (detailing report on income of YouTube stars based on advertising deals). 
 73. See Brooks Barnes, Bigger Screen for a High-Pitched Whine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at 
C1 (discussing the feature film built around Cruikshank’s “Fred” character). 
 74. See id. (discussing involvement of longtime Hollywood producer/director Brian Robbins and 
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While Mr. Cruikshank may have decided to work with established Hollywood 
veterans for any number of reasons, recent developments in digital film technology 
have made it possible for individuals in his situation to feasibly create their own 
professional-grade feature film.  The use of digital, rather than photographic, film 
radically reduces the cost of shooting and producing prints of audiovisual works.75  
Moreover, digital film can be professional quality—in fact, many major films, 
including one that won an Academy Award for Best Cinematography, are now shot 
digitally.76  Digital cameras themselves have become significantly more affordable: 
in 2010, a major network television show was shot on a consumer DSLR camera.77 
Independent filmmakers have been reaping the benefits of the lower costs 
associated with digital filmmaking for some time.78  Few, however, have taken 
advantage of the ability to self-distribute their works on the Internet.79  This is, 
perhaps, due to filmmakers’ desire for a theatrical release—to see their works 
screened in a theater, rather than on a computer screen or home television.  
Interestingly, an individual operating on a small budget can even achieve limited 
theatrical distribution for a digital work.80  As more and more theater chains adopt 
digital delivery models, in which they can receive a digital print directly over the 
Internet, the availability of this form of self-distribution will increase.81 
As of the writing of this Note, prominent filmmaker Kevin Smith is in the midst 
of an experiment in direct distribution.  Smith independently produced his horror-
 
writer David A. Goodman).  Fred:  The Movie became a major success when it aired on the Nickelodeon 
television network.  See Press Release, Nickelodeon, Nickelodeon Closes Week as Basic Cable’s Top 
Total Day Network With Kids and Total Viewers (Sept. 21, 2010), 
http://biz.viacom.com/sites/nickelodeonpress/NICKELODEON/Pages/default.aspx (detailing ratings for 
Fred:  The Movie, which made the film the top rated basic cable program of the week, with 7.6 million 
viewers as of its initial airing).  
 75. For example, Star Wars:  Episode II—Attack of the Clones producer Rick McCallum 
estimated that shooting the film digitally saved $1.8 million in print costs.  See Tom Harris, How Digital 
Cinema Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/digital-cinema.htm/ 
printable (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (describing advantages and disadvantages of digital film 
production). 
 76. Press Release: Slumdog Millionaire Shot With Innovative SI-2K Digital Cinema Camera, 
SILICON IMAGING (Jan. 31, 2009), http://www.siliconimaging.com/DigitalCinema/News/PR_01_31_09_ 
Slumdog.html. 
 77. Vlad Savov, Canon 5D Mark II Used to Shoot Entire House Season Finale, Director Says It’s 
‘The Future’, ENGADGET (Apr. 13, 2010, 8:02 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2010/04/13/canon-5d-
mark-ii-used-to-shoot-entire-house-season-finale-direc/.  The same camera was used to shoot a feature 
film.  See Charlie Sorrel, Searching for Sonny—First Feature Shot on DSLR, WIRED (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/04/searching-for-s/. 
 78. See, e.g., Tayfun King, Movie-Makers Go Digital, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/4565771.stm (discussing ultra-low budget digital 
films entered at prestigious Sundance Film Festival). 
 79. A notable exception is the Finnish science fiction parody Star Wreck:  In the Pirkinning.  
Released for free on the Internet, Star Wreck became the most watched Finnish film of all time, with 
more than eight million views.  See Stuart Kemp, Revolver Takes Aim With “Star Wreck”, THE 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/ revolver-takes-aim-
star-wreck-80421. 
 80. See Richard Corliss, Can This Man Save The Movies? (Again?), TIME, Mar. 20, 2006, at 32, 
32–38. 
 81. See id. (predicting the future in which all films are distributed to theaters digitally). 
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comedy film Red State for roughly four million dollars.82  Rather than sell it to a 
distributor, Smith decided to take the film “out on the road” on a city-by-city 
schedule that he analogized to a music tour.83  His reasoning was straightforward:  
had he sold the film to a studio, that studio would have spent roughly twenty 
million dollars on marketing.84  After accounting for studio overhead and the hefty 
percentage of the gross paid directly to theaters, Smith estimates the film would 
have had to earn fifty million dollars to break even.85  By self-distributing, Smith 
argues that his film can be financially successful while taking in significantly less 
gross revenue.86  Smith may have a point that independent films are poorly served 
by large studio marketing techniques, but it remains to be seen whether Red State 
will actually succeed outside the studio framework.87 
While low budget independent movies produced with digital technology are 
relatively common, nonstudio supported “television” is much rarer.88  During the 
2008 Writers Guild of America labor strike, however, several experienced 
television producers attempted to create their own programming and distribute it 
via the Internet.89  Perhaps the most prominent of these strike-born projects was 
“Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog,” a series of live-action shorts written, directed 
and produced by longtime television producer Joss Whedon and starring Emmy 
Award winning actor Neal Patrick Harris.90  Whedon funded production himself, 
 
 82. He was able to limit the film’s budget to such a relatively modest amount by acquiring union 
waivers and convincing some participants to accept less than their standard work rate.  See Kevin Smith, 
Sundance 2011 “Red State” Full Speech on Film Distribution, YOUTUBE (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90pcHCF2h44 [hereinafter Smith, Distribution]. 
 83. See id. (“True independence isn’t making a film and selling it to some jackass.  True 
independence is schlepping [it] to the people yourself, and that’s what I intend to do.”).  Smith had 
originally hoped to secure nationwide distribution, but he quickly abandoned that goal.  See infra note 
87. 
 84. The $20 million figure is obviously an estimate, but one very much based in reality.  Smith is 
referring to Lionsgate’s standard policy of spending $20 million on marketing each and every film it 
distributes.  See Smith, Distribution, supra note 82 (discussing the “Lionsgate 20”). 
 85. Id. (referring to his hit film Clerks, Smith noted that “it took seven years for . . . a movie that 
cost $27,575 dollars to go into profit.”) 
 86. Id. 
 87. While the Red State tour was modestly successful through August 2011, Smith has already 
abandoned the dream of widespread theatrical distribution.  See Red State Makes Green!, RED 
STATEMENTS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://theredstatements.com/2011/08/30/red-state-makes-green-plus-v-o-
d-on-91 (detailing city by city ticket sales for Red State tour); Robert Fischer, The GQ&A:  Kevin Smith, 
GQ (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.gq.com/entertainment/movies-and-tv/201108/kevin-smith-interview-
red-state (discussing Smith’s reasons for not continuing pursuit of nationwide distribution).  Instead, 
Smith opted to release the movie as a video on demand offering, via YouTube, iTunes and various cable 
television and Internet service providers.  See Red State Makes Green!, supra (discussing film’s 
September 1, 2011 premiere on video on demand). 
 88. The term “television” here is not used to refer to audiovisual works broadcast on network or 
basic cable channels but, rather, to episodic audiovisual works featuring a recurring set of characters. 
 89. Joseph Menn, Writers Making A Break For Web; At Least Seven Groups of Striking Guild 
Members are Looking at Internet Alternatives to Bypass the Studio System, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, 
at A1 (describing plans to distribute audiovisual works via the Internet during labor strike). 
 90. See David Sarno, Whedon Makes Crashing Waves, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at E1 
(discussing the production of “Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog”); Yvonne Villarreal, Creative Arts 
Emmys March to ‘The Pacific’, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at D7 (noting Harris’s two Emmy wins). 
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for roughly $200,000.91 The program was a success:  it became the most 
downloaded show in Apple’s iTunes store, spawned a soundtrack and Web comic 
and was named one of Time Magazine’s 50 Best Inventions of 2008.92  Still, it is 
not clear that Whedon’s model is replicable.  Beyond the cost, Whedon 
acknowledged that “Dr. Horrible” was created with “waivers and favors,” meaning 
that he received waivers from a variety of creative unions to allow their members to 
work for reduced fees.93 
Just prior to the strike, Marshall Herskovitz and Ed Zwick, a pair of experienced 
television producers, experimented with a different approach to Internet television 
programming.  Their creation, “Quarterlife,” was a drama series produced 
specifically for the Internet in conjunction with the social networking site 
MySpace.94  Although the producers would not reveal the program’s budget, they 
stated it was significantly more than one for a typical web series.95  “Quarterlife,” 
too, was an online success—so much so that NBC decided it wanted to broadcast 
the program on its network.  The terms of deal struck by Herskovitz and Zwick 
with NBC were notable.  Under their agreement with MySpace, Herskovitz and 
Zwick owned the copyright to “Quarterlife.”  Rather than transfer the copyright to 
NBC, the producers licensed it, albeit at a lesser fee than that for which typical 
broadcast-run programs are licensed.96 
While there are reasons to believe that the “Quarterlife” licensing deal was an 
isolated agreement brought about by the particular conditions of the 2007–2008 
Writers Guild strike, the deal nevertheless shows that, theoretically, professional 
level, episodic audiovisual storytelling may be achieved without writers 
surrendering their copyright.97  “Quarterlife” was not, however, a network 
television success; in fact, it “bombed,” producing the worst ratings for its timeslot 
on NBC in two decades.98  Moreover, even if the show had garnered more positive 
ratings, it isn’t clear that the licensing agreement would have provided NBC with 
anywhere near the profit potential of a program wholly owned by the network, 
 
 91. Matt Roush, Exclusive:  First Look at Joss Whedon’s “Dr. Horrible”, TV GUIDE EDITORS’ 
BLOG (June 30, 2008), http://web.archive.org/web/20080822100528/http://community.tvguide.com/ 
blog-entry/TVGuide-Editors-Blog/Roush-Dispatch/Joss-Whedon-Dr/800042425. 
 92. Anita Hamilton et al., The Best Inventions of 2008:  The Direct-to-Web Supervillain Musical, 
TIME, Nov. 10, 2008, at 67, 79. 
 93. Roush, supra note 91.  For a discussion of why waivers are not commonplace, see infra notes 
138-140 and accompanying text. 
 94. See Joseph Menn, TV Pros Plan MySpace Show, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at C3 
(describing the origins of “Quarterlife”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Bill Carter, NBC Acquires “Quarterlife”; Internet Series Will Run First Online, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at C4 (discussing the “revolutionary” licensing deal). 
 97. Exactly how revolutionary the “Quarterlife” deal was is certainly debatable.  NBC made the 
agreement roughly one month into the 2007-2008 Writers Guild strike.  At the time, the network was 
desperate for programming and, because “Quarterlife” was first produced for the Internet and, thus, not 
governed by the WGA’s Minimum Basic Agreement, production on the program could continue during 
the strike.  See Joseph Menn, Web Series’ Timing is Prime, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at C1 
(describing NBC’s need for programming); see also Carter, supra note 96, at C4 (noting importance of 
“Quarterlife” continuing production during the strike). 
 98. See NBC Drops, Bravo Gets “Quarterlife”, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at E2. 
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because NBC would have forgone much of its potential syndication revenues, 
which form a large part of a television program’s long-term earning potential.99  
Thus, absent some unforeseen, disruptive circumstance, it is unlikely that television 
networks would enter into similar agreements in the future. 
B.  LICENSING SCHEMES 
While film and television studios are likely to eschew nontraditional ownership 
schemes, there is some reason to believe they will eventually be forced into new 
business models by the accessibility of production and distribution tools to the 
general public.  As Yochai Benkler has observed: 
A billion people in advanced economies may have between two billion and six billion 
spare hours among them, every day.  In order to harness these billions of hours, it 
would take the whole workforce of almost 340,000 workers employed by the entire 
motion picture and recording industries in the United States put together, assuming 
each worker worked forty-hour weeks without taking a single vacation, for between 
three and eight and a half years!100 
Indeed, some studios have already recognized the value of contributions made by 
the public, albeit only in marketing studio-produced products.101 
For these independent endeavors to succeed, there must be some determination 
as to who owns what portions of the finished work.  Because of the large number of 
creative contributors to audiovisual works, such a determination is not simple.102  
In studio productions, this issue is ‘solved’ by the work for hire doctrine—the 
studio owns the creative works of all the individual collaborators and, thus, owns 
the work as a whole.  Without work for hire, however, solutions are less clear.  
While there have been suggestions that audiovisual works would optimally be 
categorized as joint works, the prevalent view in the United States is that 
audiovisual ownership issues can best be overcome through licensing.103 
The licensing model has already proven effective in another intellectual property 
arena:  software development.  “Free” or “open source” software employs a variety 
of licenses to create products that are simultaneously open to the public and 
commercially exploitable.104  The licenses allow commercial exploitation while 
 
 99. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 197 (discussing significance of syndication fees). 
 100. BENKLER, supra note 17, at 55. 
 101. A small step in this direction was Warner Bros. allowing the Harry Potter children’s fansite 
“The Daily Prophet” to use copyrighted materials.  See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 17, at 205–12. 
 102. See Dougherty, supra note 34, at 267–71 (examining the complexities associated with the 
authorship of motion pictures). 
 103. See id. at 274–82, 327–34 (examining both joint work and licensing schemes).  Some 
countries, such as Spain, have ownership schemes that treat writers, directors and composers as joint 
authors of an audiovisual work.  See Alberto Bercovitz et al., Spain, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4(1)(a)(ii), at SPA-30 to SPA-31 (Paul E. Geller ed., 2010) [hereinafter GELLER, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT] (discussing Spanish law vesting initial ownership in an audiovisual 
work’s director, writer and composer). 
 104. See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 17, at 179–82 (discussing Red Hat, Inc.’s success in 
combining free software with commercial goals). 
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preventing companies from turning free software into proprietary code.105  Most 
importantly for the purposes of this Note, free software licenses show that 
community-driven creation can succeed on a large, complex scale.106 
Software code is, in some ways, akin to other creative endeavors such as fiction 
writing and filmmaking.  It is therefore not surprising that the open source software 
model was applied to creative works in the form of Creative Commons.107  Creative 
Commons offers a series of licenses that can protect varying degrees of an artist’s 
rights.108  The core idea behind the licenses is that creators can collaborate by 
allowing others to build on their work without fear of infringing copyright.109  
Theoretically, enough collaborative creators, working as volunteers, could create 
high-level audiovisual products at very little cost in a manner similar to that 
achieved by the free software movement. 
Of course, while computer code and audiovisual entertainment both involve 
creation, they are wildly different enterprises.  Large-scale collaborative 
audiovisual production has not been achieved.  Still, there is reason to believe it can 
be done.  Perhaps the easiest form of audiovisual creation with which to mimic 
software production is animation.  As with software, animation is created by a large 
number of individuals, working alone towards a common goal—where a 
programmer works on a particular subset of code, an animator works on a particular 
character or individual scene.110  In many cases, an animator’s work, particularly if 
it is the animation of a character, may have an independent value that a piece of 
code would not.  With properly constructed licenses an animator could retain some 
portion of his rights in the character while still contributing the character to a 
collaborative work.111 
To some degree, creative activity governed by contract is exemplified by 
another audiovisual art form:  the videogame.  Videogames are generally created 
either as work for hire products or as independent works that are later licensed to a 
larger videogame distributor.112
 
Typically, a game is a work for hire if the 
developer or artist is hired to create a game for a property already owned by the 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 66–67 (describing the complexities involved in the creation 
and evolution of the Linux operating system). 
 107. See History, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2011) (discussing open source software as an inspiration for Creative Commons licenses).  See 
also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE:  VERSION 2.0 199 (2006) (describing Creative Commons as an attempt 
to follow the example of open source software pioneer Richard Stallman). 
 108. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 109. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 455 (arguing that the most important “innovation of Creative 
Commons is its character as a . . . ‘free culture’ movement”). 
 110. See Robert P. Merges, Response, Individual Creators in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 793, 800 (2010) (discussing the role of an individual animator in the creation of an animated 
feature film). 
 111. Id. at 799–802 (discussing the potential application of prelicensing rules to collaborative 
animation). 
 112. See Leena M. Sheet & A. Benjamin Katz, Protecting Rights in Videogames:  Next Generation 
Licensing, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 124, 128–29 (2006). 
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parent company—these games make up the majority of the prominent ‘name’ titles 
available on major gaming platforms.113  Independent videogames tend to be 
smaller in budget and in scope but ‘indie’ gaming is a thriving industry unto 
itself.114  While independently created videogames show that audiovisual works 
can be created and distributed outside of a studio system, they differ so 
significantly from live action audiovisual works that it is not clear whether this 
success can be analogized to the potential success of digital indie films or television 
programs. 
Most obviously, live action audiovisual works present an additional layer of 
complication in that the actual production of the work must be done in the same 
place at the same time.  While the various pieces of an animated product can be 
created by different artists, in different locations and at different times, a director, 
cinematographer and actor must all work together at once to actually shoot a live 
action film.  This type of work method does not, of course, lend itself to the sort of 
Internet-driven mass collaboration that made free software a success.  There is, 
however, still a place for such collaboration in live action creation.  Aspects of both 
pre- and postproduction could theoretically be effectively crowd-sourced.  In 
preproduction, the creation of storyboards—drawings or animations laying out the 
individuals shots that will constitute the film—can be produced collaboratively in a 
manner similar to animation.115  In postproduction, editing, special effects and 
sound mixing can be performed by individuals working towards a common goal.116  
Creating licenses to cover these various creative inputs would be a complex 
undertaking, but it is certainly achievable.  There are, however, other significant 
roadblocks that stand in the way of creating professional-quality audiovisual works 
through mass collaboration. 
C.  POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF AUDIOVISUAL 
WORKS 
In the production of audiovisual works, the significant difficulty is not with 
creating a single work on a limited budget but, rather, with creating a career’s 
worth of works with budgets that allow an individual to continue working entirely 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Andrew Webster, Low Prices, Low Expectations? Ars Looks at Indie Game Pricing, ARS 
TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2010, 7:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2010/12/low-prices-low-
expectations-ars-looks-at-indie-game-pricing.ars (“Indie games . . . compete with mainstream titles that 
have bigger budgets and more resources….”).  Independent games can be very successful, both critically 
and financially.  See Andrew Webster, Building a Hit, One Block at a Time:  The Creation of Minecraft, 
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2010, 7:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2010/09/building-a-hit-
one-block-at-a-time-the-creation-of-minecraft.ars.  In fact, the success of independent games has 
convinced some studio developers to “go indie.”  Ben Kuchera, Feral Developers:  Why Game Industry 
Talent is Going Indie, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 23, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2011/08/ 
experience-going-indie.ars. 
 115. BENKLER, supra note 17, at 294–97 (“We are seeing the broad emergence of business models 
that are aimed precisely at providing users with the tools to write, compose, film, and mix existing 
materials, and to publish, play, render, and distribute what we have made to others, everywhere.”). 
 116. See id. (discussing various production tools already available to the average citizen). 
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outside the studio system.  While an entertainment world in which independent 
audiovisual works can be produced and distributed affordably is certainly a 
theoretical possibility, complex issues in both production and distribution would 
have to be overcome.  The major issue in distribution is whether digital distribution 
across the Internet will continue to be free, or nearly so.  This is, of course, the 
issue of network neutrality.117  While a full discussion of net neutrality is beyond 
the scope of this Note, it is worth briefly examining the possibility that the new 
digital distribution model will wind up looking quite a bit like the old one. 
1.  Barriers to Distribution 
While digital distribution currently offers live action audiovisual artists a low-
cost method of reaching the public with their creations, it is not at all clear that this 
access will continue in the future.118  The major concern for artists is that the small 
number of Internet Service Providers will employ prioritization schemes whereby 
different forms of information will be charged different fees for carriage across a 
digital network.119  As audiovisual works occupy a significant amount of 
bandwidth, prioritization would present an economic obstacle for individual artists.  
Moreover, Internet service may become so “thoroughly managed, monetized, 
prioritized, filtered, packaged, and non-executable” that it will closely resemble 
today’s cable television.120  Indeed, service providers are already moving in this 
direction by tying an individual’s access to Internet programming directly to that 
individual’s cable television subscription.121 
 
 117. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 141 (2003) (discussing various approaches to network neutrality); see also Rob Frieden, A 
Primer On Network Neutrality, 43 INTERECONOMICS 4 (2008), available at http:// 
www.intereconomics.eu/archiv/autor/437/ (outlining basics of network neutrality debate). 
 118. See WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 55, at 297–98 (“The individual holds more power than 
at any time in the past century . . . Whether or not he can hold on to it is another matter.”). 
 119. On Dec. 23, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission took a first step towards, 
perhaps, preserving some form of network neutrality.  See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N., FCC 10-201, 
PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET BROADBAND INDUSTRY PRACTICES (Dec. 23, 2010).  However, the 
FCC’s proposed rules lack specificity and it remains to be seen how, and even if, they will be applied.  
See Tim Wu, The Art of “Kicking The Can”—Uncertainty Rules When It Comes to Net Neutrality, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 23, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/23/net-neutrality-rules-uncertainty/ 
(discussing the lack of clarity in the potential effects of FCC rules); see also Nate Anderson, Net 
Neutrality Fight:  GOP Wields Garlic Against FCC “Vampires”, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2010), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/01/net-neutrality-fight-gop-wields-garlic-against-fcc-
vampires.ars (discussing legislation introduced in House of Representatives to bar FCC from regulating 
the Internet). 
 120. Susan P. Crawford, The Looming Cable Monopoly, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 
34, 38 (Dec. 16, 2010).  See also, WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 55, at 318 (suggesting that the 
potential for control of information is significantly increased on the Internet). 
 121. See Parul P. Desai, The Emerging Online Video Market, 993 Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, Cable & Broadband Industry Law 2010, 
PLI Order No. 22634 287, 291-92 (Practising Law Institute, Jan.–March 2010) (discussing new access 
models employed by major Internet service providers).  In one high-profile example, the Fox Network 
decided to limit next day online access to its programming.  Under Fox’s approach, only individuals 
who subscribe to an authorized cable television provider will be able to view Fox programming online 
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For individual artists, the implementation of a cable television model for Internet 
distribution would create the same problems faced today:  a lack of distribution 
outlets for their work would place artists in a difficult bargaining position and 
likely prevent them from retaining ownership of their works.122  However, even if 
the Internet remains a free and accessible form of distribution, audiovisual artists 
will face considerable difficulties in producing their works outside of the studio 
system. 
2.  Barriers to Production 
Thus far, this Note has discussed ways in which the cost of producing 
audiovisual works can be lessened with the use of digital camera and film,
 
 and 
mass collaboration on aspects of filmmaking, such as storyboarding and editing.123  
And while it is clear that films and, to a lesser extent, television programs can be 
produced on limited budgets outside of the studio system, it is not as certain that an 
individual audiovisual artist can build a career on this sort of production.124  The 
reason for this, in large part, is the overwhelming union presence in the 
entertainment industry.  Most Hollywood professions, whether creative or 
noncreative, are unionized:  there are unions for writers,125 directors,126 editors,127 
cinematographers,128 actors129 and most other members of a film crew.130  Each of 
 
the day after it airs on television.  All other online viewers will be required to wait eight days.  Brian 
Stelter, Fox to Limit Next-Day Streaming On Hulu to Paying Cable Customers, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 
2011, at B3. 
 122. For a full discussion of the difficulties artists face when negotiating with the oligopoly that 
controls current content distribution, see supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text (discussing financial savings offered by 
shooting in digital film).  See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text (discussing low budget 
production opportunities). 
 124. See supra notes 79–93 (discussing prominent nonstudio audiovisual projects). 
 125. The Writers Guild of America, East and Writers Guild of America, West represent 
Hollywood screenwriters.  See generally WGA 2008 MBA, supra note 51. 
 126. Beyond representing film and television directors, the Directors Guild of America (DGA) 
represents Unit Production Managers, who are responsible for the physical production of a film or 
television show, and First and Second Assistant Directors, who are responsible for the day-to-day 
scheduling and functioning of a shoot.  See Basic Agreement of 2008, DIRECTORS’ GUILD OF AMERICA, 
INC., 17–20 (2008), available at http://www.dga.org/Contracts/Creative-Rights/Basic-Agreement-
Article-7.aspx [hereinafter DGA Agreement] (defining individuals covered by DGA jurisdiction). 
 127. Editors are represented by the Motion Picture Editors Guild—Local 700 of the International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Motion Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts (IATSE).  
See A Brief History of the Editors Guild:  Local 700, MOTION PICTURE EDITORS GUILD, 
https://www.editorsguild.com/Guildshistory.cfm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
 128. Cinematographers are represented by the International Cinematographers Guild—Local 600 
of IATSE.  See About Local 600, INTERNATIONAL CINEMATOGRAPHERS GUILD, https:// 
www.cameraguild.com/AboutUs/aboutus.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
 129. The Screen Actors Guild (SAG) represents the majority of film and television actors in the 
United States and many abroad.  See Membership Overview, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, 
http://www.sag.org/content/membership (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (describing membership as “120,000 
talented and accomplished artists worldwide.”).  Many television actors are also represented by the 
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA).  See About Entertainment, AFTRA 
(July 20, 2009), http://www.aftra.org/32CEABDDE9E94150B2ABC4CC4D200AB1.htm (describing 
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these unions has an agreement with the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television 
Producers (AMPTP), the trade association that represents all of the major 
production companies in the entertainment business.131  Thus, the films and 
television shows produced in Hollywood are staffed almost entirely by union 
workers.  Union workers are guaranteed certain minimum fees for their work, as 
well as pension and health benefits.132  While these guarantees are undoubtedly a 
benefit to the unions’ members, they also represent a significant financial barrier to 
an audiovisual artist seeking to produce professional quality work outside of the 
studio system. 
Perhaps the best way to explain the issues faced by an audiovisual artist is with a 
hypothetical example.  An aspiring writer pens a script and decides to direct and 
produce it on her own.  By employing nonunion workers, she can create a 
professional looking, feature-length, live action film for as little as ten thousand 
dollars.133 
The writer now has two distribution options:  traditional studio distribution or 
independent digital distribution.  In the traditional scenario, the writer tries to sell 
her completed film to a studio that will distribute it.134  If a studio is interested, it 
will acquire all of the rights in the film and often sign the writer to a development 
deal—a fixed term contract during which the artist will create new works 
exclusively for the studio.135 
 
history and scope of television representations). 
 130. IATSE represents numerous noncreative audiovisual workers, including stagehands and script 
supervisors.  Other workers, involved in aspects of filmmaking such as building and tearing down sets or 
moving the film company between locations, are represented by other labor unions, such as the 
Teamsters Local 399 of Hollywood.  See Agreement of August 1, 2007 Between Producer and Studio 
Transportation Drivers, LOCAL #399 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 79–90 
(2007), available at http://entlabor.com/uploads/2007_Black_Book_Agreement_1_.pdf [hereinafter 
Teamsters Agreement] (detailing daily rates for wide range of covered workers, from drivers to dog 
trainers to wranglers). 
 131. See About Us, AMPTP, http://www.amptp.org/aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
 132. See Teamsters Agreement, supra note 130, at 79–90 (listing rates for various jobs).  See also 
WGA 2008 MBA, supra note 51, at 303 (detailing minimum compensation for various forms of 
screenwriting); 2009 Basic Agreement and Television Agreement—Minimum Rates, SCREEN ACTORS 
GUILD (2009), available at http://www.sag.org/files/sag/documents/2009%20TV%20Theatrical% 
20Rates%206%2011%2009%20final.pdf (detailing rates for actors in various audiovisual productions). 
 133. A recent example of such a low-budget success was the horror movie Paranormal Activity, 
written and directed by Oren Peli on an $11,000 budget.  See Scott Pierce, Review:  Low-Budget 
Paranormal Activity Thrills with High-Value Horror, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2009), http:// 
www.wired.com/underwire/2009/10/paranormal-activity-review/.  A paradigm example of the arc of a 
low-budget writer-director’s career is that of Clerks creator Kevin Smith.  See WU, MASTER SWITCH, 
supra note 55, at 234 (discussing the purchase and distribution of Clerks by independent film company 
Miramax). 
 134. Artists often attract studio attention by entering their films in film festivals.  This is how 
Paranormal Activity attracted the interest of Dreamworks’s parent company, Paramount Pictures.  See 
Pierce, supra note 133 (describing the film’s path from obscurity to theatrical release). 
 135. This is, for example, what happened to Paranormal Activity director Peli, who signed a deal 
to produce further features for Paramount.  The studio also convinced Peli to alter his original film’s 
ending before theatrical release.  See Ian Crouch, Boo! Paranormal Activity’s Writer-Director on 
Scaring Everyone at a Theater Near You, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.observer.com/ 
2009/culture/boo-paranormal-activities-scaring-everyone-theater-near-you (discussing changes to film’s 
(6) Schwab 1/26/2012  1:44 PM 
162 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [35:1 
The artist looking to create outside the studio system would take a different 
approach and attempt to distribute her work digitally, either directly to theaters or 
over the Internet.136  Assume the artist is able to succeed in distributing her work 
without studio assistance and the project gains a level of popularity that allows the 
artist and others involved in the production to reap some monetary reward.137  
Now, the artist is faced with a choice in determining how to proceed with her 
second film.  If she wants to hire experienced professionals, she will almost 
certainly have to pay union wages:  union agreements with the AMPTP are 
reciprocal—the producers agree to pay certain wages while the workers agree not 
to work on non-AMPTP productions.138  Many unions will allow one-time waivers 
that permit producers to employ workers without adhering to some or all of its 
basic agreement rules.  No union, however, would continuously grant waivers to 
the young writer-director:  to do so would effectively put her beyond union control, 
which, if she were successful as posited, would undermine the unions’ purpose.139  
Thus, if she wants to employ established, professional talent in making her second 
film, then the young writer-director will have to pay union rates, health insurance 
and pension compensation.140 
Of course, it can be argued that because the writer-director made one successful 
picture with nonunion workers, she should be able to make another.  While this is 
certainly a possibility, it may not be as simple as the artist continuing to work with 
 
ending before theatrical release). 
 136. For a discussion of nontraditional distribution, see supra notes 78–87 and accompanying text. 
 137. While this result is certainly possible, few Internet auteurs have managed to successfully 
monetize their creations.  But see supra note 79 (discussing success of Finnish parody film released on 
the Internet).  This is also essentially the route being taken by Kevin Smith in his independent 
distribution of Red State.  See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 138. See, e.g., Global Rule One, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, http://www.sag.org/content/global-rule-
one (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (describing union’s primary rule as “a SAG member must . . . NEVER 
work non-union”); Code of Working Rules, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, http:// 
www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=71 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“No member shall accept 
employment with, nor option or sell literary material to, any person, firm or corporation who is not 
signatory to the applicable MBAs.”); Bylaws—2008, TEAMSTERS LOCAL 399, § 32 (2008), available at 
http://www.ht399.org/pdf/contracts/by-laws/By-Laws.pdf (listing offenses leading to fines or expulsion, 
including working for nonunion Producers or accepting less than union-scale wages); cf. Tris Carpenter, 
Sounding Off on Non-Union Post Houses, MOTION PICTURE EDITORS GUILD (Oct. 28, 2008), 
https://www.editorsguild.com/FromTheGuild.cfm?FromTheGuildid=22 (discussing the successful 
movement to force AMPTP film to use IATSE Local 700 Editors). 
 139. Interestingly, before the 2007–2008 Writers Guild strike, and the subsequent agreements 
between the AMPTP and ‘creative’ unions, such as the WGA, DGA and SAG, those unions did not have 
jurisdiction over Internet productions.  See, e.g., DGA Agreement, supra note 126, at 479 (stating the 
new Basic Agreement extends to productions exhibited on the Internet or on mobile devices).  Thus, 
under the old union agreements, waivers for Internet-only productions might not have been necessary. 
 140. This is one reason why the second feature by an independent director is often significantly 
more expensive to produce.  In the case of Paranormal Activity, see supra notes 133–35, the sequel cost 
an estimated $2.7 million, or nearly 250 times as much as the original.  See Rafer Guzman, ’Paranormal 
Activity 2’:  It’d Be One Big Happy Family If Not for the Haunted House, NEWSDAY, Oct. 23, 2010, at 
B8 (discussing production and estimated budget of sequel).  It is also why Kevin Smith’s ‘independent’ 
production of Red State cost $4 million, despite numerous fee waivers, while his first film, the truly 
independent Clerks, cost $27,500.  See supra notes 82–87. 
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the same crew as she had before.  If the first film were a success, it is likely that 
other members of the production crew would have their own opportunities to work 
on Hollywood creations.  Once any of those individuals agreed to work on an 
AMPTP film, he or she would be required to join the appropriate union.141  The 
young writer-director, too, would be required to join a union or unions if she 
wished to work on AMPTP projects.142  Thus, if the young writer-director wanted 
to make a career’s worth of nonunion projects, she would need to either convince 
her original collaborators to forgo any studio employment or continuously 
replenish her pool of nonunion individuals who nevertheless possessed professional 
production ability and experience—a daunting task.143 
None of this is to argue that entertainment industry unions are a negative force 
in and of themselves.  In fact, the opposite is true:  these unions have long protected 
the rights of workers who were poorly treated in the early Hollywood system.144  
However, the unions’ control over the majority of professional, experienced 
audiovisual production talent means that, in order for an artist to produce multiple 
projects outside of the studio system, she will need a significant revenue stream 
which is likely, paradoxically, to come only from the sort of heavily marketed, big 
budget projects financed by the studios. 
III.  WORK FOR HIRE IN THE FUTURE 
The concept of audiovisual artists using fees earned from working on studio 
productions to finance their own independent work is not new.145  Such an 
 
 141. See, e.g., WGA 2008 MBA, supra note 51, at 23–27 (outlining terms by which writer 
employed on AMPTP production must join the WGA within thirty days); DGA Agreement, supra note 
126, at 20–21 (discussing requirement that all workers in DGA-covered categories on AMPTP project 
must join union). 
 142. See WGA 2008 MBA, supra note 51, at 23–27 (stating writers on AMPTP must be union 
members); DGA Agreement, supra note 126, at 20 (stating directors, assistant directors and UPMs on 
AMPTP projects must be union members). 
 143. This is a difficult proposition.  While prominent actors, writers and directors often command 
fees far in excess of the minimums required by their guilds, such minimums can represent a significant 
salary increase for “below the line” workers and for less well-known creative personnel.  See supra 
notes 125–32 and accompanying text.  It should be noted that there are audiovisual artists who manage 
to create a career outside the studio system:  documentary filmmakers.  However, documentaries are 
distinguishable from the majority of audiovisual works in a number of ways.  First, documentaries have 
a distinct public interest angle that informs not only the work itself but also the career choices of 
documentary artists.  See American Dreams, Not Made in the U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 
B32-33 (discussing Hoop Dreams director Steve James’s commitment to documentary filmmaking 
because, in his words, “[T]here’s nothing quite as thrilling and eye-opening and . . . moving as following 
people’s lives like this.”).  Moreover, documentaries require neither writers nor actors, and can be made 
with significantly smaller production crews.  This is especially true because many of the traditional crew 
staffing requirements of the various unions are presumptively relaxed for documentaries.  See, e.g., 
Documentary Agreements:  Key Provisions, DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA, available at http:// 
www.dga.org/Contracts/Agreements.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“[W]aivers of mandatory staffing 
will be granted if the Director is able to perform all DGA-covered duties.”). 
 144. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 52 (discussing the role of the Writers Guild in 
protecting artists from studio mistreatment). 
 145. A prime example of this is director John Sayles (The Secret of Roan Inish).  Sayles worked as 
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approach is, however, limited by the amount of money an individual can make as a 
work for hire writer.146  After all, work for hire employees are paid a flat fee—their 
profit participation, if any, typically comes after the studio has accounted for all of 
its costs, including overhead, and taken a substantial distribution fee.147  In order 
for audiovisual artists to consistently take advantage of the opportunities to create 
and distribute their works outside of the studio system, they will need increased 
remuneration from their studio-controlled work.  One method for achieving greater 
economic rewards for artists is by modifying the work for hire doctrine.  To that 
end, Section A of this part will examine alternatives to work for hire exercised by 
members of the European Union in determining copyright ownership of 
audiovisual works, and then suggest adoption of some of these approaches.  Section 
B will then examine the benefits and harms that might be caused by replacing the 
work for hire doctrine with a different ownership scheme. 
A.  OWNERSHIP OF AUDIOVISUAL WORKS IN “AUTHORS’ RIGHTS” EUROPEAN 
UNION COUNTRIES 
National audiovisual copyright laws may generally be placed in two categories: 
industrial copyright countries, in which initial ownership often vests in the entity 
that finances the creation of the work, and artists’ rights countries, in which initial 
ownership vests in the individual or individuals who actually create the work.148  In 
European countries that follow the artists’ rights model, a variety of schemes are 
used to deal with assigning initial ownership in audiovisual works.149  When the 
work is created by employees, many countries provide for an implied presumption 
 
a high-profile screenwriter for Hollywood productions such as Apollo 13 and The Quick and the Dead in 
order to finance his low-budget, independent works.  Despite his success as a screenwriter, Sayles 
struggled to consistently fund his films, many of which had to be produced outside the United States.  
See Biography of John Sayles, JOHN SAYLES, http://www.johnsayles.com/body-bio.html (last visited 
Sep. 23, 2011) (quoting Sayles as stating that “[i]t makes no sense for film makers to seize the means of 
production unless they also seize the means of distribution and exhibition (and get a good cut of the 
ancilliaries.)”). 
 146. See id. (detailing the difficulties in financing even “micro-budget” films). 
 147. This arrangement, called “gross after break-even,” is the most common profit-sharing benefit 
offered to audiovisual artists.  See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 182 (describing profit-sharing arrangements 
in the entertainment industry).  In fact, due to a variety of accounting practices, many ‘successful’ films 
will never break even.  Id. at 182–206 (detailing entertainment industry accounting practices); see also 
Smith, Distribution, supra note 82 (detailing how, despite enormous box office success of a film with a 
budget of just $27,000, it took seven years for the film to “break even”). 
 148. See PASCAL KAMINA, FILM COPYRIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 170 (2002) (discussing 
ownership laws in industrial copyright countries, such as the United Kingdom); id. at 170–72 
(differentiating between ownership laws in industrial copyright countries and artists’ rights countries 
such as Spain and France).  While European countries that follow the industrial model do vest 
ownership in the audiovisual work’s producer, that producer is not considered the author of the 
underlying works (such as scripts), as he would be under the work for hire doctrine.  See id. at 167 
(discussing rejection of “[t]he solution of granting authorship in contributory works” to film producers 
in industrial copyright countries).  In the U.K., authorship rights are divided between a film’s producer 
and its director.  Id. at 170. 
 149. See, e.g., GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 103 (discussing Spanish law 
vesting initial ownership in audiovisual works’ director, writer and composer). 
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of assignment of rights to the employer—but, significantly, the presumption only 
applies to rights necessary to economically exploit the work in question.150 
The key issue in suggesting an alternative to the work for hire doctrine in United 
States law is whether such an alteration would be unacceptably harmful to the 
Hollywood entertainment conglomerates.151  The basic concept of a presumed 
assignment of rights to the studios, rather than a direct grant of authorship, might 
be problematic in that the artist could retain reversion rights, potentially preventing 
the studio from producing future derivative works, a cornerstone of the 
entertainment industry.152  While very few copyrights retain value that far into the 
future, those that do, such as Mickey Mouse, are extremely valuable to the studios 
that own them.153 
Another potential issue for entertainment conglomerates would arise if the 
presumed assignment included only the rights necessary to commercially exploit 
the audiovisual work in question.154  The problem with this approach, from 
Hollywood’s point of view, is that it does nothing to secure the conglomerates’ 
rights in two very important areas:  merchandising and sequels.  French law, for 
example, provides that the presumptive assignment is for the rights to “all possible 
means of exploitation” except “graphic” and “theatrical” works.155  However, it is 
unclear whether such exploitation of an audiovisual work would cover 
merchandising and sequels.156  This question is particularly important as it concerns 
blockbuster Hollywood films, which are increasingly aimed at enhancing the value 
of the underlying characters or franchise, rather than on ticket sales at the 
multiplex.157 
On the other hand, it is questionable whether the retention of theatrical and 
graphic rights alone would create a large enough revenue stream to allow artists to 
 
 150. See, e.g., id. at BEL-1(2)(a) (discussing presumed transfer of necessary rights in Belgium); 
see also id. at SPA-1(1)(b) (discussing presumed transfers in Spain).  Some countries create different 
presumptions for different creative contributions.  See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:  
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 213–14 (2001) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT] 
(discussing the differentiation between presumptions “depending on the class of work . . . treating 
music, say, differently from a scenarios.”) 
 151. Obviously, the major studios would be against any alteration to the work for hire doctrine, 
since it favors their interests so strongly.  The real issue is whether a change would so undermine the 
conglomerate system that it would no longer be able to function.  See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 17, at 
291 (arguing that “$100 million blockbusters” would be impossible without a copyright protected studio 
system). 
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (providing for termination rights for works other than those made for 
hire).  See WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 55, at 225–35 (examining major studio reliance on films 
that spawn sequels and other licensing opportunities). 
 153. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 268 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing studies 
showing that fewer than two percent of copyrights retain value after fifty-five years). 
 154. For examples of limited assignments, see supra notes 150–52. 
 155. See KAMINA, FILM COPYRIGHT, supra note 148, at 183–84 (discussing breadth of exploitation 
rights under French law). 
 156. Id. at 183. 
 157. See WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 55, at 227–32 (arguing that the modern studio’s goal is 
to develop valuable properties and make its money from licensing them in as a wide a multiplicity of 
forms as possible). 
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consistently produce union work outside of the studio system.158  However, 
audiovisual artists do not need all merchandising or sequel rights in order to build a 
successful alternative career.159  Thus, the most equitable alternative would be a 
hybrid of the French system.  For an original creative work, the work for hire 
doctrine would be replaced with a presumed assignment system.  The assignment to 
the studios would include all rights necessary to exploit the audiovisual work in 
question—including merchandising rights, but excluding theatrical and graphic 
rights.160  However, those rights would not include the right to produce sequels to 
or remakes of the original works—if those works were, in fact, original.  Works 
based on a previously existing product—for example, films based on the Harry 
Potter novels—would still be considered traditional work for hire products.  In 
other words, work for hire would continue to apply to individuals hired to create a 
derivative work based on pre-established intellectual property.161  This approach 
would benefit artists, the viewing public and perhaps even the studios themselves. 
B.  BENEFITS AND HARMS OF REPLACING THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE 
There are a number of benefits to be derived from replacing the work for hire 
doctrine with the implied assignment rule discussed in Part III.A, supra.  Obvious 
gains will accrue to individual artists, but there are also potential benefits for the 
general public and for the entertainment industry as a whole. 
The most basic benefit for artists would be a potentially significant increase in 
profits.  Those profits, combined with digital production and distribution, could 
enable an artist to produce major audiovisual projects outside the studio system.  
This, in turn, creates further positive outcomes:  artists, unfettered by studio 
 
 158. A small number of theatrical productions of audiovisual works, such as Shrek:  The Musical 
and The Addams Family, have been financially successful, but there is not yet a large market for this sort 
of adaptation.  For example, in the past five years, only ten percent of Broadway musicals have been 
based on audiovisual works.  For the purposes of this Note, “musicals based on audiovisual works” are 
defined as those based on movies or television shows that were themselves original creations.  Original 
research was conducted through the Internet Broadway Database, which maintains records from the 
beginning of New York theater through the present.  See Advanced Search for Shows, Internet 
Broadway Database (IBDB), http://www.ibdb.com/advSearchShows.php, (to reproduce these results, 
select “Musical” for show type and select “1/1/2006” to “1/1/2011” as the “Opening Date” range; then 
follow “Search” hyperlink). 
 159. One famous writer-director, George Lucas, did manage to secure the merchandising rights to 
his hit film, Star Wars.  See DALE POLLOCK, SKYWALKING:  THE LIFE AND FILMS OF GEORGE LUCAS 
174 (updated ed. 1999).  Those rights have been worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  Id. at 287.  This 
bonanza allowed Lucas to produce his Star Wars prequels without studio assistance—Twentieth Century 
Fox’s only participation was to act as the film’s distributor, for which they received a small percentage 
of the gross.  Id. at 289. 
 160. These rights are generally understood to be fairly narrow.  Theatrical rights are rights to 
produce the work in a live theater setting.  Graphic rights cover the ability to produce graphic novels, 
otherwise known as comic books.  See GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 150, at 
210–14. 
 161. Of course, this arrangement could create perverse incentives for studios to produce an even 
greater number of derivative films and thereby stifle, rather than encourage, the independent artist.  For 
a further discussion of this possibility, see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
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mandates, would have greater freedom to express themselves, whether in the stories 
they choose to tell or the types of people they choose to tell stories about.162  
Moreover, expanding artists’ ownership rights will enhance their bargaining power 
if they do choose to create projects for the studios:  an artist who wanted to could 
potentially bargain away derivative works rights in exchange for studio support to 
produce a project with only marginal marketability.163  This, too, could result in a 
wider variety of audiovisual art being produced and disseminated to the public. 
An increased number of artistic viewpoints also benefits the general public.  On 
the simplest level, more divergent creations have the potential to provide 
entertainment to a larger number of individuals.  More significantly, however, 
diversity in audiovisual art may also foster diversity of political and racial 
representation.  Under the current entertainment conglomerate system, such 
representation is often lacking in the audiovisual products distributed to the 
public.164  A lack of diverse viewpoints can have an adverse impact on viewers and, 
therefore, any opportunity to increase the public’s exposure to varied stories and 
perspectives should be welcomed.165 
The benefit for large studios in replacing the work for hire doctrine with a more 
nuanced presumptive assignment system is certainly less obvious since the status 
quo works to their benefit.  However, allowing artists to create works on a smaller 
scale, and with a smaller budget, would not directly compete with the studios’ 
primary products: the blockbuster film or twenty-two episode per season network 
television program.  Moreover, a nonstudio creative environment could provide the 
studios with an important talent development program: in much the same way that 
 
 162. Studio ownership of creative programming has resulted in a legion of stories about changes 
made to projects, sometimes without the creator’s consent or participation.  While these alterations can 
often be classified as no more than a difference of opinion, sometimes they appear to be actual 
censorship of an artist’s message.  That was the case in a recent controversy between the creators of the 
animated television show, “South Park,” and its corporate owners, Viacom International.  See Dave 
Itzkoff, ‘South Park’ Episode Altered After Muslim Group’s Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 2010, at 
C3 (detailing Viacom’s decision to censor episode of popular TV show over objection of show’s 
creators).  Moreover, racial minorities have long been underrepresented in Hollywood, both behind and 
in front of the camera.  See, e.g., Don Aucoin, ‘Airbender’ Reopens Race Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, July 
4, 2010, at N9 (discussing the controversy surrounding the high-profile film’s casting of white actors in 
Asian roles); Report Says Blacks are Underhired in Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at C12 
(citing an NAACP study, which found that African-Americans were “underrepresented ‘in each and 
every aspect’ of the entertainment industry”). 
 163. Increased bargaining power could also result in more young artists being given opportunities 
to secure studio financing.  Studios might opt to hire more unproven artists willing to cede their 
ownership rights in exchange for the opportunity to create a high-budget project. 
 164. Mark Cooper, Study 18:  The Contemporary Terrain of Media and Politics Demands More 
Concern About Concentration of the Mass Media, in THE CASE AGAINST MEDIA CONSOLIDATION:  
EVIDENCE ON CONCENTRATION, LOCALISM AND DIVERSITY (Mark N. Cooper ed. 2007) (discussing the 
limiting effect media conglomerates have on the expression of political views). 
 165. See, e.g., Dana E. Mastro et al., Exposure to Television Portrayals of Latinos:  The 
Implications of Aversive Racism and Social Identity Theory, 34 HUM. COMM. RES. 1, 19 (2008) 
(“[V]iewers may derive normative cues from television content and use these to guide their racial 
expressions.”).  Interestingly, the authors found that portrayals of Latinos on television affected both 
Latino self-perception and the perception of Latinos by white viewers.  Id.  For a full discussion of the 
entertainment conglomerates that currently dominate audiovisual production, see Part I.B, supra. 
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music videos have supplied the film industry with successful directors, nonstudio 
productions could help the studios identify talented writers, directors, 
cinematographers and actors.166  Finally, it is important to note that studios would 
not be losing control of their most valuable products:  films based on intellectual 
property that is “easily identifiable” based on an “existing reputation.”167  An 
environment that supports both individualized, independent creation and large-
scale, highly expensive audiovisual productions is not unimaginable:  it is, in fact, 
the environment of videogame production today.168 
One drawback of this scheme is that providing studios with more complete 
ownership rights in works based on pre-existing properties incentivizes them to 
simply recycle intellectual property rather than create truly new artistic works.  It 
is, however, apparent that studios are already primarily in the business of 
exploiting, rather than creating, intellectual property.169  Another concern is that 
there is little question that modifying the work for hire doctrine will harm the 
economic bottom line of entertainment conglomerates.  However, the purpose of 
the Copyright Clause is not to protect the incomes of a few large corporations; it is 
to “promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts” for the benefit of the 
American people.170  Modifying the manner in which we allocate rights in 
audiovisual works would assist in realizing this goal. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the American entertainment industry, artists do not own their work.  Writers 
can imagine, create and execute every aspect of an audiovisual work and still have 
no creative control over its final appearance, and no financial stake in its outcome.  
The ‘authors’ of American films and television are a handful of large corporations.  
As a result, the viewing public is denied the variety of artistic, political and racial 
viewpoints it might otherwise enjoy. 
Technological developments offer the possibility that this state of affairs can be 
altered and artists might be able to create professional audiovisual works outside 
the studio system.  However, professional caliber live-action production is 
expensive, particularly the set rates demanded by Hollywood unions.  An 
individual artist cannot simply rely on the promise of crowd-sourcing to create an 
audiovisual work; she needs the capital to employ experienced professionals.  That 
capital can only come with the protection of copyright law—but a copyright law 
unencumbered by the work for hire doctrine. 
 
 166. Directors who began their careers in music video include David Fincher (The Social 
Network), Spike Jonze (Being John Malkovich) and Gore Verbinski (Pirates of the Caribbean). 
 167. See WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 55, at 228–29 (observing that the most expensive films 
of the 2000s were all based on preexisting properties). 
 168. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing independent and studio production 
in the videogame industry). 
 169. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (discussing studio reliance on intellectual 
property they already own).  See also supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text (discussing studios’ 
focus on the licensing of existing properties). 
 170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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